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Management's Right to Resort to Injunctive Relief and
Self-Help in Order to Prevent Trespassory Union
Activity: An Examination of May Department
Stores Co. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 743
INTRODUCTION
A determination whether an employer may resort to injunc-
tive relief in order to prevent trespass by non-employee union
members necessitates a consideration of the federal preemption
doctrines that surround the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).1 The individual chapters making up Title 29 of the
NLRA contain the major labor acts of the twentieth century,
each enunciating certain congressional policies designed to pro-
tect, through federal jurisdiction, organized labor's efforts to
bargain collectively. However, viewed from an historical per-
spective, they represent a congressional response to a conserva-
tive interpretation that had been consistently applied to previ-
ous labor legislation by the United States Supreme Court.2 With
the acceptance of collective bargaining, both judicially and con-
gressionally, as a legitimate element in the balance of power
between labor and management, the issue of preemption has
turned upon which of the congressional policy considerations
that formulate the basis of federal preemption should control.
1. Labor Management Relations Act § 1 et seq. as amended 29 U.S.C. § 151
et seq. (1970).
2. The Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52, ch. 5, was designed to prevent the
application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act against organized labor in the form
of injunctive relief. Allan Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3 International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945). The Norris - La Guardia
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101-115, ch. 6, was a congressional effort to further limit judicial
application of injunctive relief against organized labor activities for violations
of the Sherman Act despite section 52 of the Clayton Act. United States v.
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). Section 101 of the Norris - La Guardia Act
specifically declared injunctive relief was subject to public policy considera-
tions contained within section 102. The NLRA subchapter II of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1947) rested squarely upon the
Supremacy Clause by declaring labor's right to bargain collectively was found-
ed upon the adverse effects management's denial of that right had upon inter-
state commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970); see Mastro Plastics Corp. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 350 U.S. 270, rehearing denied 351 U.S. 980 (1956).
The most explicit judicial interpretation of congressional in-
tent in enacting the NLRA was that of the United States Su-
preme Court in its decision in San Diego Building Trades Coun-
cil v. Garmon.3 In what came to be known as the Garmon
doctrine, federal preemption was held to be exclusive if the
disputed labor activity is or may arguably be, subject to either
section 74 or section 85 of the NLRA.6
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a
state purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the [NLRA], or
constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the feder-
al enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield. To leave the
states free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of
federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between
power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state
law. . . . At times it has not been clear whether the particular activity
regulated by the states was governed by § 7 or § 8 or was, perhaps,
outside both these sections. But courts are not primary tribunals to
adjudicate such issues. It is essential to the administration of the act
that these determinations be left in the first instance to the National
Labor Relations Board.
7
The judicial rationale behind the Garmon doctrine involved a
recognition that remedies available within state substantive law
may well be in conflict not only with federal substantive law but
also between state enforcement and administrative agencies
and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the
specialized federal agency established to administer the NLRA.
In reaffirming the preemption principles laid down in Garmon,
the Supreme Court stated as follows:
The technique of administration and the range and nature of those
remedies that are and are not available is a fundamental part and
parcel of the operative legal system established by the [NLRA] ....
The rationale for preemption, then, rests in large measure upon our
determination that when it set down a federal labor policy Congress
plainly meant to do more than simply to alter the then prevailing
substantive law. It sought as well to restructure fundamentally the
processes for effectuating that policy, deliberately placing the respon-
sibililty for applying and developing this comprehensive legal system
3. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
4. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,. National Labor
Relations Act, § 7 as amended 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
5. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - (1) to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 157 of this title,. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(A)(1) as amend-
ed 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1).
6. 359 U.S. at 244.
7. 359 U.S. at 244-245.
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in the hands of an expert administrative body rather than the
federalized judicial system.8
Whether a non-employee union member may trespass upon
management property for the solicitation of management's non-
union employees is a question that has been specifically reserv-
ed by the Supreme Court, 9 and thus is a marked example of the
need for interpretation of congressional intent regarding feder-
al preemption principles applicable in such situations. The obvi-
ous conflict exists between the need of the state to insure an
adequate remedy for private property owners against unlawful
trespass and the federal policy of encouraging employee organi-
zation and collective bargaining.
This note will examine a recent Illinois Supreme Court deci-
sion, May Department Stores Co. v. Teamsters Union Local No.
743,10 in which it was held that the NLRA had not divested state
courts of jurisdiction to hear an employer's request for injunc-
tive relief to prevent trespass by non-employee union members,
notwithstanding the fact that the union had filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the NLRB. The Illinois Supreme Court
based its decision to uphold the application of criminal trespass
statutes against non-employee union members upon the follow-
ing two recognized exceptions to the Garmon doctrine: "Where
the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the
Labor Management Relations Act"11 or "where the regulated
conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional
direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the
States of the power to act."' 2
The decision is particularly significant in that before the Il-
linois Appellate Court reversed the circuit court's order grant-
ing the injunction, 13 the NLRB regional director notified the
union that the Board would refuse to issue a complaint against
8. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274,287-
288 (1971) (footnote omitted).
9. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 427 v. Fair Lawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S.
20, 24 (1957).
10. 64 Ill. 2d 153, 355 N.E. 2d 7 (1976).
11. 359 U.S. at 243.
12. Id. at 244.
13. May Department Stores Co. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 743, 32 Ill.
App. 3d 916, 337 N.E. 2d 299 (1976).
Venture Stores (a subsidiary of May Department Stores) for
engaging in an unfair labor practice. Subsequent to the appel-
late court's decision, the director of the NLRB Office of Appeals
affirmed, without a formal hearing on the merits, the regional
director's decision. The grounds for the Board's refusal to issue
a complaint, as stated in a letter to the union, were as follows:
"The evidence is insufficient to show that there were no ade-
quate alternate means by which the Union could identify and
contact Venture Store employees particularly in view of the fact
that the Union made no attempt to utilize such
alternatives .... 14
It is this author's contention that the Illinois Supreme Court
placed an unduly restrictive interpretation on the NLRA, con-
trary to the clearly expressed congressional policy in favor of
peaceful concerted activity as a recognized means of collective
bargaining in labor-management relations. Absent a compelling
state interest in controlling existing violent conduct, as justifica-
tion for intervention, the fact situation in May Department
Stores presents a clear question of the preemption policy con-
siderations that should control a state's assumption of juris-
diction. Furthermore, the alternate means suggested by the
NLRB were rendered impractical if not impossible by the phys-
ical setting of the site in question. Rather than an urban setting
with a single entry and employee residences nearby, the site was
a suburban shopping center surrounded by large parking areas
open to the public. 1
5
The following analysis is premised on the supposition that a
doctrine of preemption which provides management with the
opportunity to invoke local criminal trespass laws against or-
ganized labor is to afford management a remedy which is de-
nied labor. The implications of such a doctrine would seriously
distort the balance of power Congress sought to establish be-
tween labor and management through the enactment of the
NLRA.1
6
THE APPELLATE COURT DECISION
Venture Stores operates a department store on a block of
property bounded on three sides by public sidewalks. The store
itself is located at the center of the block and is surrounded by
14. 64 Il. 2d at 158-59, 355 N.E. 2d at 9.
15. See Broomfield, Preemptive Federal Jurisdiction over Concerted
Trespassory Union Activity, 83 HARV. L. REv. 552, 553-554, (1970); [hereinafter
cited as BROOMFIELD].
16. Id. at 564-566.
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large parking areas to accomodate customer parking. One
month prior to the store's opening in March, 1975, the Teamsters
Union Local No. 743, sought to persuade Venture employees
and prospective employees to join the union. The organizational
efforts were made outside the store in adjoining parking areas
and were limited to the hours before the store opened and after
it closed. Venture filed a complaint for a permanent injunction
and a petition for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the
union and its representatives from soliciting employees on Ven-
ture's premises. The complaint charged that the organizational
campaign was carried on despite state and village anti-trespass
laws, despite requests that it be stopped and despite the store's
posted rule prohibiting solicitational activity for any purpose by
either employees or non-employees. Before the opening of court
on the morning Venture's petition for the temporary restraining
order was to be heard, the union filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the NLRB. In response to Venture's complaint, the
Union filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the NLRA had
preempted the State's jurisdiction. The Circuit Court of Cook
County granted Venture's motion for a preliminary injunction,
which by its terms enjoined solicitation on Venture's property
but permitted it on adjacent public sidewalks. 17
In dismissing the order granting the injunction, the appellate
court distinguished People v. Goduto,18 where a non-employee's
conviction for trespassing on private property for the purpose
of distributing union literature was upheld. The defendants in
Goduto contended that the state court was without jurisdiction
to invoke the trespass laws because the NLRA had preempted
the jurisdiction of the state court since the disputed labor activi-
ty was arguably protected by section 7 or prohibited by section 8
of the NLRA. It was held that the defendant's refusal to desist
after requested to do so created an imminent threat of violence
since the employer would have to resort to self-help if unable to
avail himself of the trespass statute. 19
However, the court in. Goduto, relying upon National Labor
Relations Board v. Babcock and Wilcox Co.,20 did recognize a
17. 32 Ill. App. 3d at 917, 337 N.E. 2d at 300-01.
18. 21 111. 2d 605, 174 N.E. 2d 385, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961).
19. Id. at 609-610, 174 N.E. 2d at 387.
20. 351 U.S. 105 (1956). In recognizing that an accomodation of property
rights and organizational rights is necessary in the context of labor disputes, the
limited right of trespass by union organizers when reasonable
alternative means of communication were not available and the
jurisdiction of the NLRB had been invoked.
Congress has given union organizers the right to go on company
property under certain circumstances and has provided a procedure
for determining and enforcing this right. The union has failed to
follow the procedure that Congress has provided. We are unwilling to
hold that the State courts are divested of jurisdiction, not because
Congress has preempted the area, but because of the course the union
organizers have followed.21
The appellate court in May Department Stores regarded the
union's failure to invoke the NLRB in Goduto as a "conclusive"
distinction.22 However, they also cite the following passage from
Babcock and Wilcox Co. as a further restriction on state juris-
diction: "'[T]he determination of whether there are no other
reasonable alternate channels of communication with employ-
ees or the no solicitation rule is being unfairly applied is com-
mitted primarily to the National Labor Relations Board
[citation] . . .and we have no jurisdiction to determine such
questions.' "23
The appellate court's citation of the preceeding passage from
Babcock and Wilcox Co., as well as its distinction of the proce-
dures followed by the union in Goduto is illustrative of the
confusion that exists in regard to the NLRA's preemptive scope
and effect upon state substantive law and procedure. The appel-
late court left undecided the important issue of whether petition
of the NLRB is, in fact, a conclusive distinction, or whether the
NLRA preempts state jurisdiction before petition to the Board
when the activity in question is, or may arguably be, subject to
either section 7 or section 8 of the NLRA. The latter alternative
would seem to be the proper conclusion since that approach
would be consistent with allowing the Board to accomodate the
respective rights of the parties in the first instance.
24
In such situations the nature of preemption itself necessitates
a conclusion that preemption attaches before, and is dependent
upon, an initial determination by the NLRB. If not, preemption,
regardless of the activity involved, would be dependent upon
the mere administrative act of filing an unfair practice charge
with the NLRB. Furthermore, the petition to the Board would
Court in Babcock and Wilcox Co., held preemption proper since the determina-
tion of the proper adjustment must rest with the NLRB in the first instance. 351
U.S. at 112.
21. 21 Ill. 2d at 614, 174 N.E. 2d at 389 (emphasis added).
22. 32 Ill. App. 3d at 921, 337 N.E. 2d at 303.
23. Id. at 921, 337 N.E. 2d at 304.
24. See 351 U.S. 105, 112, supra note 20.
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have to be filed prior to the complaint seeking relief in the state
court. The final determination as to whether or not state juris-
diction is preempted would therefore revolve around the out-
come of a race by the union to the NLRB and management to
the local state court.
It was precisely that fact situation which occurred in the in-
stant case and as a result prompted the Illinois Supreme Court
to state as follows:
As a practical matter, acceptance of the appellate court's reasoning
would result in the emasculation of the Goduto principal since a union
could then unilaterally divest the court of jurisdiction by the mere
filing of a charge regardless of its merit.
25
The rationale behind the creation of the NLRB is clearly con-
trary to any interpretation of the NLRA that would hold state
substantive law controlling in the absence of affirmative action
by one party in petitioning the Board.26 To hold otherwise would
in effect render all rights guaranteed under the NLRA depen-
dent upon their assertion before the Board rather than the con-
gressionally intended result that they serve as a backdrop be-
tween labor and management, guaranteeing balance and the
exercise of good faith.
Thus, although both Garmon and the appellate court held
federal jurisdiction to be exclusive 27 once preemption attaches,
the appellate court, in its distinction of Goduto and reliance on
Babcock and Wilcox, failed to reach a consistent or conclusive
determination of the primary issue considered on review by the
Illinois Supreme Court. Stated in context, the issue before the
Illinois Supreme Court was whether preemption attached be-
fore or after the NLRB was petitioned by the union.
28
25. 64 Ill. 2d at 163; the court's reference to the Goduto principal is not in
reference to the distinction between filing and not filing a complaint with the
Board but to the following earlier statement in the opinion: "We adhere to the
holding of Goduto that under the Garmon doctrine the States are not preempt-
ed from jurisdiction of a tresspass action involving non-employee union organ-
izers." Id. at 163.
26. See note 8, supra, and accompanying text.
27. 32 Ill. App. 3d at 922, 337 N.E. 2d at 305.
28. The Illinois Supreme Court correctly stated the issue as follows: "The
primary issue to be considered is whether the Circuit Court was without juris-
diction to enter the temporary injunction prohibiting the ongoing trespass by
the union." 64 Il. 2d at 159, 355 N.E. 2d at 9.
THE DECISION OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT
It must be observed initially that the Supreme Court of the
United States has never fully addressed the subject of concerted
trespass by organized labor. Without the authority of a control-
ling opinion to rely upon, the respective states have, at their
pleasure, found trespassory union activity either within or with-
out the preemption doctrine enunciated in the Garmon deci-
sion.29 The decision of the Illinois Supreme Court is illustrative.
In Taggart v. Weinacker's Inc.,30 an opinion quoted at length by
the Illinois Court, Mr. Chief Justice Burger, concurring, specif-
ically rejects any contention that the States are preempted from
applying state trespass laws in order to prevent trespass on an
employer's premises.3 The fact that the NLRB was or was not
petitioned is immaterial as it was also to the Illinois Supreme
Court which found the "Chief Justice's observations highly per-
suasive."32 The argument of the Illinois Supreme Court and Mr.
Chief Justice Burger is as follows: if an activity is arguably
subject to section 7, and therefore preempted by the NLRA, the
fact of preemption creates an artifical area of "no-law" since in
the absence of an unfair labor practice by the union, manage-
ment is powerless to petition the NLRB to prevent an illegal
trespass upon its premises.3 3
The Chief Justice contends that in order to avoid the creation
of such a "no-law" area Congress intended the rights guaran-
teed under section 7 of the NLRA to be construed as enacted
against the backdrop of state trespass laws.
29. See Sears, Roebuck and Company v. San Diego County District Council
of Carpenters, 17 Cal. 3d 893,553 P.2d 603,132 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1976). (NLRB never
invoked, following Garmon test of arguably subject to section 157, where con-
certed activity is peaceful); Musicians Union Local No. 6 v. Superior Court, 69
Cal. 2d 695, 447 P.2d 313, 73 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1968) (NLRB never invoked, injunc-
tion held improper under law of tresspass or otherwise, as an exercise of the
power reserved to the states to insure public health or safety); People v. Bush, 39
N.Y. 2d 529, 349 N.E. 2d 832 (1976) (NLRB never invoked, held: "where private
property is involved, union rights under section 7 are limited and must be made
clear on its initiative in advance." Id. at 538, 349 N.E. 2d at 838.); Hood v.
Stafford, 378 S.W. 2d 766 (1964) (follows Goduto); Moreland Corporation v.
Retail Store Employees Union Local No. 444, 16 Wis. 2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876
(1962) (held, states have jurisdiction to enjoin tresspass, even assuming the
presence of the necessary federal jurisdictional requirements, citing Goduto);
Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union Local No. 1207, 363 P. 2d 803 (Wash. 1961)
(action for tresspass by a shopping center owner against a labor union held
arguably subject to NLRA, thus depriving state court of subject matter juris-
diction).
30. 397 U.S. 223 (1970).
31. Id. at 227-28, (Burger, C.J., concurring).
32. 64 Ill. 2d at 161, 355 N.E. 2d at 10.
33. 397 U.S. at 228, (Burger, C.J., concurring); See BROOMFIELD, supra note
15 at 555.
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Rather, [Congress] has acted against the backdrop of the general
application of State trespass laws to provide certain protections to.
employees through § 7 of the NLRA [citation]. A holding that the
States were precluded from acting would remove the backdrop of
state law that provided the basis of congressional action but would
leave intact the narrower restraint present in federal law through § 7
and would thereby artificially create a no-law area.34
The Illinois Supreme Court basically followed the same struc-
tural analysis but erred critically by defining its reasoning in
terms of the Garmon doctrine. In holding that a state's trespass
laws fall within certain recognized exceptions to the Garmon
doctrine,35 it in effect recognized that the activity in question
(trespassory union solicitation) was arguably subject to section
7 of the NLRA and thus within the scope of federal preemption.
The distinction is important since under the approach taken
by the Chief Justice, the danger of a "no-law" area falls at a
point before those rights guaranteed under section 7 come into
play. The consequent result is that all union trespassory activity
would be outside the scope of federal preemption and thus
subject to state anti-trespass laws. To reach that conclusion it
would be necessary to assume that Congress was unaware of
the possible power management possessed in securing injunc-
tive relief from the State courts in such situations.
This author contends that a workable approach can be found
if the NLRA is interpreted as classifying a union's trespass
despite a no solicitation rule by management, as a labor dispute
not preceeding, but falling between the narrow confines of sec-
tion 7 and section 8. State assumption of jurisdiction would then
become possible only where the nature of the union's response
to management's ban on solicitation subjected it to the existing
exceptions under the Garmon doctrine.
Utilizing the preceeding approach would avoid the dangers
recognized by the Chief Justice as well as take into con-
sideration possible unfair labor practices by management
which may in effect render the union's trespassory activity nec-
essary per the Babcock and Wilcox Co. decision.
In its recognition that a state's trespass laws fall within the
existing exceptions to the Garmon doctrine, the Illinois Su-
34. 397 U.S. at 228, (Burger, C.J., concurring).
35. See notes 11 and 12, supra and accompanying text.
preme Court follows basically the same approach. It is their
analysis and conclusion in relation to those exceptions to which
this note takes exception.
In Garmon the Supreme Court cites Association of Machin-
ists v. Gonzales36 as its only authority for the state's ability to
assume jurisdiction in matters of peripheral concern to the
NLRA.3 7 Gonzales involved an action against the union for
breach of contract in the expulsion of a union member who
sought restoration of his membership and damages for his al-
leged illegal expulsion. The Supreme Court held preemption did
not occur since the "subject matter of the litigation ... was the
breach of contract governing the relations between [Gonzales]
and his union" and did not concern itself with the union-caused
employer discrimination that the NLRA was designed to pre-
vent.
38
The validity of the Gonzales exception as authority for the
Illinois Court is questionable for three reasons. First, the fact
situation in Gonzales, a dispute between a union and union
member, justified the Court in labeling the dispute as a periph-
eral concern of the NLRA. The present fact situation is com-
pletely inapposite. Second, the two subsequent Supreme Court
decisions referring to the Gonzales exception 39 have each in-
volved disputes between a union and its members, and third, in
both Journeymen Local 100 v. Borden4" and Iron Workers Local
207 v. Perko,4 1 the Supreme Court narrowed the exception an-
nounced in Gonzales and held each case was arguably either an
unfair labor practice or activity protected under section 7 and
thus state jurisdiction was preempted by Garmon. In Perko, the
Court distinguished Gonzales as follows: "[A]s in Borden, the
crux of the action here concerned alleged interference with the
plaintiff's existing or prospective employment relations and
was not directed to internal union matters. '42
The second exception announced in Garmon is as follows:
"[W]here the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of
compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Con-
36. 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
37. 359 U.S. at 244 n.2.
38. 356 U.S. at 621-622.
39. Journeymen Local 100 v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963); Iron Workers
Local 207 v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963).
40. 373 U.S. 690 (1963).
41. 373 U.S. 701 (1963).
42. 373 U.S. at 705 (emphasis added); Come, Federal Preemption of Labor
Management Relations: Current Problems in the Application of Garmon, 56
VA. L. REV. 1435-1436 (1970).
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gress had deprived the states of the power to act. '4 3 The cases
cited by the court in Garmon4 4 and subsequent case law apply-
ing this exception 45 have made it clear that the exception deals
with massive threats of violence or actual violence.
46
The Supreme Court of Illinois found an imminent threat of
violence due to the fact that the NLRB was powerless to afford
Venture a remedy absent an unfair labor practice by the union,
and was therefore left only the remedy of self-help if not able to
rely upon the trespass statutes.47 However, the instant fact situa-
tion makes clear there was no violence or threat thereof. The
mere possibility of violence has never before been held suffi-
cient to warrant state assumption of jurisdiction where the con-
certed activity in question "shows no signs of presently becom-
ing violent and which does not physically interfere with the
employer's operations or other's access to his place of busi-
ness."
48
The Supreme Court of California has, on two occasions, ad-
dressed the issue of peaceful concerted activity on private pro-
perty as justification for the state's assumption of jurisdiction.4 9
43. 359 U.S. at 244 n.2.
44. International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agriculture Im-
plement Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (mass picketing and threats of
harm to body and property of non-striking employees); Youngdahl v. Rainfair,
Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (injunction upheld in relation to violence and obstruction
of entrances and exits of employers premises, reversed in relation to all peaceful
activity); United Automobile, Aircraft and Agriculture Implement Workers v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 351 U.S. 266 (1956) (mass picketing
resulting in obstruction to plant entrance and exit, interference with use of
public roads, and threats of physical injury to non-striking employees and their
families); United Construction Workers v. Laburnum, 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (sus-
tained award for damages under state tort law for violent conduct. The Court in
Garmon noted "in Laburnum this court expressly phrased its grant of certiorari
to include only the limited question of the State's jurisdiction to award damages
'[i]n view of the type of conduct found by the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia to have been carried out by Petitioners' (citation omitted)." 359 U.S. at
247 n.6.
45. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (brandishing
of weapons).
46. See Broomfield, supra note 15 at 559-60.
47. 64 Ill. 2d at 162, 355 N.E.2d at 10-11; Cox, Labor Law Preemption Re-
visited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337, 1362-1363 (1972).
48. BROOMFIELD, supra note 15 at 565-566.
49. Sears, Roebuck and Company v. San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters, 17 Cal. 3d 893, 553 P.2d 603, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1976); Musicians
Union, Local No. 6 v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. 2d 695, 447 P.2d 313, 73 Cal. Rptr.
201 (1968).
In each case the NLRB had not been invoked, and in each the
Court held that peaceful labor picketing arguably subject to
section 7 or 8 of the NLRA may not be enjoined solely because
the disputed activity constitutes a trespass on private proper-
ty.10 Both decisions recognized that the need for accomodation
between private property rights and those rights guaranteed
under the NLRA are, in the absence of actual violence or threats
thereof, subject to the NLRB in the first instance. Furthermore,
the availability of injunctive relief to management before a de-
termination by the NLRB would not serve to protect the public
safety when the disputed trespass was peaceful, but in fact
protect the private right of the property owner to post its pro-
perty. 1 Realizing that the injunction so used would afford man-
agement a remedy denied labor and thereby affect the econom-
ic struggle between the two parties, the California court stated
as follows: "It is for the Board, however, to determine whether
and how to protect a party against activities that the Act 'argu-
ably' protects or prohibits. 5 2
To better understand the opposite conclusions reached by the
California and Illinois Supreme Courts requires an examina-
tion of the rationale behind the violence exception to the Gar-
mon doctrine as well as the exclusive nature of federal preemp-
tion. That analysis will hopefully lead the reader to the conclu-
sion that the correct approach is that taken by the California
Supreme Court.
The rationale behind Garmon's second exception lies within
the inherent police power of the states to preserve domestic
peace and insure public safety.5 3 Trespass laws have traditional-
ly been designed to insure that peace by eliminating the need for
the property owner to resort to self-help.5 4 However, the United
States Supreme Court has recognized that in the context of
labor disputes private property rights are not absolute.5 The
Court's most recent restatement of that position came in
Hudgens v. N.L.R.B.,56 where the Court stated as follows:
50. 17 Cal. 3d at 904, 553 P.2d at 612, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 446; 69 Cal. 2d at 710-11,
447 P.2d at 324, 73 Cal, Rptr. at 212.
51. 69 Cal. 2d at 712,447 P.2d at 324,73 Cal. Rptr. at 212; 17 Cal. 3d at 904, 553
P.2d at 611-612, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 451-452.
52. 69 Cal. 2d at 712, 447 P.2d at 324; 17 Cal. 3d at 904, 553 P.2d at 612 (citing
quotation with approval).
53. See note 44 supra; See, e.g., Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283,
297 (1959).
54. 21 Ill. 2d at 608-09, 174 N.E. 2d at 387.
55. 351 U.S. at 112; Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522 (1976).
56. 424 U.S. 507 (1976); see Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539,544
(1972).
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The Babcock and Wilcox opinion established the basic objective
under the Act: accomodation of § 7 rights and private property rights
"with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance
of the other [footnote omitted] ...." In each generic situation, the
primary responsibility for making this accomodation must rest with
the Board in the first instance.5 7
The fact situations in both Babcock and Wilcox Co. and Cen-
tral Hardware Co. v. N.L.R.B. ,58 affirming Babcock and Wilcox
Co., were specifically distinguished from those in Hudgens,
directly preceeding the Court's language quoted above.5 9 The
Court recognized those differences "may or may not be relevant
in striking the proper balance. '60
Because the Court followed its recognition that varying factu-
al situations may well lead to different results with explicit
interpretations of both Babcock and Wilcox Co. and the NLRA
as requiring the NLRB to accomodate property rights and those
guaranteed under the NLRA in the first instance, a strong argu-
ment may be made that federal law preempts state assumption
of jurisdiction regardless of whether or not the NLRB has been
petitioned. When the disputed activity is arguably subject to
either section 7 or 8, the rights of the individual parties would be
dependent upon the Board's determination of what a proper
balance should be according to variations in factual circum-
stances. The Board's findings as to what constitutes a proper
accommodation would then be subject to review through the
administrative procedures established by the NLRA. 61
If establishing a balance between labor and management is
the federal objective of the NLRA, interference by the states
57. Id. at 522 (emphasis added).
58. 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
59. In Hudgens, the union filed an unfair practice charge with the NLRB
against the owner of a shopping center whose general manager threatened to
arrest union employees who were engaging in peaceful picketing of one of the
owner's tenants, a retail store located in the center. The pickets were employees
of the retail owner's warehouse which was not located in the shopping center.
The Board upheld the charges and the shopping center owner petitioned for
review.
60. 424 U.S. at 522. The Court made reference to three distinctions. First,
the disputed conduct involved lawful economic strike activity, not organization-
al activity; second, the section 7 activity was not carried on by outsiders (al-
though they were not employees of the store located within the shopping center);
and third, since the owner of the picketed store was a tenant at the center, the
property rights infringed upon were not his but those of the owner of the center.
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970).
would seemingly be precluded. Absent a compelling state inter-
est, such as the violence exception recognized in Garmon, state
jurisdiction to grant a remedy in the first instance would be
preempted. As the Court in Garmon noted: "since remedies
form an ingredient of any integrated scheme of regulation, to
allow the state to grant a remedy here which has been witheld
from the [NLRB] only accentuates the danger of conflict. '62
If it is true that preemption exists before the NLRB is peti-
tioned, it may also be true, as a necessary corollary thereof, that
management is denied the right to resort to self-help in cases of
peaceful concerted activity that does not interfere with regular
business operations. If not denied, in each instance of trespass,
management would legally be entitled to forceably remove non-
employees from his property without seeking a determination
from the NLRB in the first instance. The following construction
adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court presents even graver
dangers: "We do not consider the mere filing of a charge by the
union to be sufficient to divest the State courts of the juris-
diction which otherwise results from the exceptions listed in
Garmon.''63 The Illinois court continues with an unduly restric-
tive interpretation of Babcock and Wilcox Co., especially in
light of Hudgens, and in effect sanctions the resort to violence:
"Babcock and Wilcox Co. stands for the proposition that em-
ployers may validly deny non-employee organizers access to
company property unless it is shown that the union had no other
reasonable means to communicate with the employees."6 4 And
thus, the pivotal issue of preemption which turns upon the
recognition of accommodation made necessary by the Babcock
and Wilcox Co. decision is ignored.
If and when actual violence does occur due to management's
resort to self-help, injunctive relief would then be appropriate,
and if the union failed to petition the Board, an arguably unfair
labor practice would be enforced through the exercise of state
jurisdiction. The alternatives for the union are wholly unsatis-
factory in this situation. If the union does petition after the
initial violent clash and is granted injunctive relief from the
Board, the employer is prevented only from further resort to
self-help. If the union is denied access because the Board deter-
mines there are adequate alternate means available, the initial
acts of violence are in effect held justified. The consequences to
62. 359 U.S. at 248 (emphasis added).
63. 64 Ill. 2d at 163, 355 N.E. 2d at 11.
64. Id. at 164, 355 N.E.2d at 11.
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organized labor relations are too great to allow such a course of
events.
A more peaceful result would follow if, as the California Su-
preme Court held, the state courts are preempted even before
the initial determination by the NLRB. However, peace is in-
sured only if management is also denied the right to resort to
self-help. The proper procedure to be followed during the in-
terim period would then seem to be that of the shopping center
owner in Hudgens. Management, as well as labor, should be
required to shoulder the burden of pursuing peaceful adminis-
trative remedies and procedures available through the NLRB.
Both the Illinois appellate and Supreme Courts placed too great
an emphasis upon union responsibility in making initial contact
with the NLRB before any reciprocal obligations attached to the
employer.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BOARD'S REFUSAL TO
ISSUE A COMPLAINT
In the present case the primary evil involved is not the Board's
refusal to issue a complaint. The union was bound to desist by
that decision and is afforded procedures for review by the
NLRA. Fault lies, if at all, with the Illinois Circuit Court's is-
suance of an injunction prohibiting the trespassory activity by
the union. As the California Supreme Court noted, injunctive
relief in such situations protects, through local trespass laws, an
arguably unfair labor practice at the expense of labor's section
7 rights. It is exactly for that reason that it is necessary for the
NLRB to determine initially the proper accomodation between
the individual parties. Interference by the state precludes the
possibility of that accomodation and grants management an
advantage Congress intended to deny.
The fact that the Board failed to issue a complaint was signifi-
cant in that it seemingly justified the Illinois Supreme Court in
its conclusion that the Babcock and Wilcox Co. and Hudgens
decisions permit management to post its property before any
determination by the NLRB to the contrary. Following that
reasoning, preemption before petition to the Board is precluded
since management is entitled to resort to self-help in order to
enforce its ban of trespassory solicitation. Recognition of self-
help as a legitimate remedy made it possible for the Illinois
Supreme Court to justify the circuit court's assumption of juris-
diction per the violence exception to the Garmon doctrine. The
final and major significance of the Board's failure to issue a
complaint will be labor's future inability in the state of Illinois to
exercise its section 7 rights whenever union trespass is involved.
To say that non-employee union organizers must first petition
the NLRB in order to enter an employer's premises posted
against solicitation, is to support in the first instance an argu-
ably unfair labor practice with the aid of state substantive law.
The entire thrust of the NLRA was to preempt the states from
asserting any such influence in labor-management relations.
FRANKJ. D'ORO, JR.
